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Institutional investors and international diversification in U.S. restaurant 
industry 
Introduction 
 Many U.S restaurant firms head overseas to increase market share and 
grow earnings (Singh, Upneja & Dalbor 2003).  Multinational restaurant firms 
outperform domestic firms in growth of operating income and pre-tax profitability 
(Singh et al. 2003).  While international units and sales in the top 100 US 
restaurant chains grew by 12.7 and 7.2 percent respectively in 1997, their 
domestic counterparts increased 2.8 and 4.8 percent respectively (Technomic Inc. 
1998; Hua & Upneja 2007).  However, there are contrasting previous studies of 
internationalization.  Several studies found positive relation between 
internationalization and firm performance (Oak & Dalbor 2010; Denis et al. 2002; 
Morck & Yeong 1992).    On the other hand, general finance literature finds that 
firm performance may decline due to the organizational complexity and the 
uncertainty related to operating in new markets (Fatemi 1984; Geringer et al. 
1989; Hitt et al. 1997).  Restaurant literature (Singh et al. 2004; Hua & Upneja 
2007) identified the risk of international diversification such as cultural and 
religious differences, different tax and accounting structures, political stability, 
fluctuations in relative values of currencies, and unfavorable macro-economic 
conditions.   
It is posited that the firm’s risk-taking behavior may change depending on 
ownership structure.  Past research has conclusively shown that institutional 
investors influence firm’s strategic decisions (David et al. 2001; Gillan & Startks 
2003; Hartzell & Starks 2003).  Over time, institutional investors have 
dramatically increased their holding of stocks in general and hospitality stocks in 
particular (Oak & Dalbor 2008a).  Therefore, it is reasonable to assume that the 
decision-making of the restaurant managers is greatly influenced by the kind of 
stake different groups of institutional investors have in the firm.  One of the 
important decisions made by managers is the extent of international 
diversification.  As stated earlier, there is considerable risk involved in 
international diversification because the returns take longer to materialize and are 
riskier in nature (Singh et al. 2004; Hua & Upneja 2007).  Different types of 
institutional investors have different time horizons for earning returns on their 
investments (Tihanyi et al. 2003). For example, banks have a very short-term 
horizon and thus are expected to oppose risky investments of all kinds, including 
international diversification.  On the other hand, public pension funds hold stocks 
for the long term (Tihanyi et al. 2003), thus they are expected to support long-
term projects.    Given the increasing influence of different kinds of institutional 
  
investors, this study will investigate whether institutional investors have an 
impact on the restaurant firm’s international diversification. 
Literature review 
The most significant phenomenon in the restaurant industry in the recent 
past has been the substantial rise in the global fast food or quick service segment.  
The fast food segment has been influenced by its development in the US and in 
2003 accounted for more than 25 percent of the world catering market (Ball & 
Roberts 2003).  According to the International Hotel and Restaurant Association 
(1998 p5), the population per restaurant unit in North America was 384.  Other 
global regions such as Europe and South Asia had population ratios of 616 and 
2,032 respectively.  The population per restaurant unit in regions except South 
America was higher than North America.  Thus, there is much more growth 
potential in other parts of the world.  While the restaurant sector developed at 
varying rates in different countries, international diversification has been 
substantial over the last three decades (Ball & Roberts 2003).  According to the 
Technomic Inc. report (2010), “international performance by the U.S. top 500 
restaurant chains outperformed their domestic countpart growth in 2009. 
International sales (up 3.3 percent) outpaced U.S. sales (down 0.8 percent). 
International unit growth was also up 5.2 percent versus 0.3 percent for U.S. unit.”  
Casual dining operations grew slowly in international diversification (Lee et al. 
2008).  While McDonald’s has 57 percent international units (18,498 over 32,478 
units in 2009), Darden and Brinker’s restaurants have 3.7 percent (65 over 1,773 
units in 2009) and 12 percent (201 over 1,689 units in 2009) international units 
(McDonald’s 2010; Darden 2010; Brinker 2010).  In Yum brands and 
McDonald’s, more than 50 percent of revenues are from overseas market in 2008 
(Basham 2010). McDonald’s revenues are internationally diversified in 2008 with 
no region accounting for even 50 percent of the total revenue: U.S. 42 percent, 
Europe 31 percent, Asia/Pacific, the Middle East, and the Africa 18 percent, other 
countries 9 percent (Basham 2010).     
Institutional investors are usually involved in strategic decision-making 
process of corporations.  When U.S. institutional investors hold portfolios of 
foreign securities, they meet barriers such as capital flows, institutional 
restrictions, and information asymmetry in international equity markets (Tihanyi 
et al.  2003).  Thus, institutional investors feel that international diversification 
through multinational firms, listed in US stock exchanges, is a better 
diversification strategy at a lower cost.  Federal Reserve Board’s Flow of Fund 
reports that institutional investors owned about 7 percent of U.S. equities in 1950 
and 51 percent in 2004 (Chen et al. 2007).  In the restaurant industry, average 
institutional ownership is 47.5 percent between 1999 and 2003 (Tsai & Gu 2007).  
  
In the lodging industry, institutional investors held 30 million shares (985 million 
dollars) in 1980 and they increased their holdings to 1,479 million shares (42,271 
million dollars) in 2004 (Oak & Dalbor 2008 a).  Of the institutional holdings, 
pension funds held 72.74 percent of total lodging shares in 2004; bank and 
brokerage firms had 13.02 percent and 11.56 percent each.  Insurance and mutual 
funds held 0.95 and 1.73 percent each in 2004. 
When institutional investors disagree with managerial decisions or face 
lower than expected stock performance, they sell out their shares (exit strategy).   
However, in the recent past growing number of institutional shareholders have 
become active monitors instead of remaining passive investors (voice strategy) 
(Tsai & Gu 2007; Bathala et al. 1994; Graves & Waddock 1990; Tayor 1990).  
Tools of corporate governance can be one-to-one meetings, voting on stockholder 
resolutions and focus lists.  Mallin (2006) describes the mechanisms of 
institutional investor’s role in corporate governance.   The meetings between 
institutional investors and investee companies are an important communication 
tool.  Because corporate managers arrange these meeting with large institutions, 
individual investors do not have a chance to attend.  The meetings are held at a 
high level and have important members of the board in attendance.  The most 
discussed topics at the meetings are areas of the firm’s strategy and planning to 
achieve the objectives.  Therefore it is clear that institutional investor’s views 
influence the board at the planning process.  
 Issues raised in the investee company’s AGM are voted by large 
institutional investors (Mallin 2006).   Institutional investors make focus lists of 
firms to target, including those firms that are either underperforming in earnings 
or those that have underperformed a main index, for example S&P 500.  If firms 
do not respond to the institutional investor’s inquiries about underperformance, 
institutional investors may look for changing directors on the board. 
 Several empirical studies demonstrate the influence of institutional 
investors on the firm’s strategy decision.  David et al.  (2001) find that 
institutional investor activism is positively associated with R&D inputs over both 
the short and long term.  This association is stronger in strategic contexts where 
R&D investments tend to increase firm value, especially when firms have high 
growth opportunities.  Gillan and Starks (2003) posit that the rise of professional 
money managers provides increased monitoring of management of firms in which 
these managers invest money.  Hartzell and Starks (2003) find that firms with a 
higher concentration of institutional investors have lower managerial 
compensation.  Therefore, it is well established that institutional holdings 
influence executive compensation structure.   
  
Depending on the type of institution investor, the role of monitoring 
differs.  Brickley et al.  (1988) report that in addition to individual investors, 
banks and insurance firms are better supporter of managerial decisions than other 
types of institutional investors (mutual funds and investment advisors) in setting 
up antitakeover amendment proposals.  Chen et al.  (2007) find that large holdings 
of independent long-term institutions (investment companies, independent 
investment advisor and public pension funds) better predict post-merger 
performance.  On the other hand, large holdings of short-term institutions 
(insurance companies and banks) do not predict post-merger performance.  
Institutions with strict fiduciary standards (bank) or firms with the shorter 
investment horizon show stronger preference for short-term earnings over long-
run value (Bushee 2001).  In the lodging industry, pension funds have a long-term 
horizon and prefer to invest in value stocks (high book-to-market ratio).  The rest 
of the institutional investors (bank, mutual fund and brokerage firms) prefer 
growth stocks (low book-to-market ratio) (Oak & Dalbor 2008b).  In the 
restaurant industry, firm- risk is not a significant factor to choose stocks because 
the industry has a low systematic risk (Tsai & Gu 2007). 
For long-term returns, institutional investors can encourage managers to 
engage in international diversification.  Internationalization can raise financial 
performance, but it takes time to realize profits (Bhide 2000).  Some institutional 
investors also have business relationships with the firms in which they are 
investing, whereas other institutional investors may not have a similar kind of 
relationship.  Therefore, we can categorize institutions in two groups.  Pressure-
resistant institutions (pension fund, mutual fund, endowments and foundations) do 
not have vital business relations with firms in which they invest and therefore 
have greater influence on firm innovation.  Pressure-sensitive institutions 
(insurance firms and banks) (Tihanyi et al.  2003) on the other hand attempt to do 
business with firms and thereby are susceptible to management persuasion.  
Ownership by pressure-sensitive institutions is significantly negatively associated 
with international venturing.  Pressure-resistant ownership is positively but 
marginally associated with international venturing (Zahara et al. 2000). These 
results support the view that some institutions encourage international ventures.  
Tihanyi et al. (2003) reports that pension funds prefer firms with international 
diversification because they are oriented to long-term performance and buy-and-
hold strategy. 
Hypotheses 
As discussed earlier, pressure-resistant groups (pension fund, mutual fund, 
brokerage firm) prefer international diversification.  Pension funds and brokerage 
firms have a long-term horizon and therefore prefer to invest in firms with an 
  
international strategy.  Pension funds tend to have emphasis on yields over longer 
time horizon than mutual funds (Tihanyi et al. 2003).  In order to protect the long-
term interests of their investors, pension fund hold very diversified portfolios 
(Bethal & Liebeskind 1993).  Mutual funds invest in firms with international 
diversification because even the announcement of international diversification has 
positive financial returns in the short-term.  Because mutual fund’s managers are 
compensated by quarterly evaluation of the sizes and net asset values of their 
portfolios, they tend to hold portfolio in a short term (Tihanyi et al. 2003).  
Previous studies show that pressure-resistant groups tend to support long-term 
value-creating activities such as R&D (Kochhar & David 1996) and long-term 
incentives in CEO compensation packages (David et al. 1998).   
Banks have strict fiduciary standards and prefer short-term earnings.  
Similarly, Insurance firms also have short-term horizons and constitute the 
pressure sensitive group, along with Banks.  When conflict arises, these pressure-
sensitive investors tend to sell their stocks and not challenge management (Jacobs 
1991; Zahra et al. 2000).  Both insurance firms and banks do not prefer 
international diversification.  Therefore, we propose the following hypotheses.  
All these hypotheses are stated in the alternative form and relate to ownership of 
restaurant firm stock by institutional investors. 
H1: Bank ownership will be negatively associated with international 
diversification. 
H2: Insurance ownership will be negatively associated with international 
diversification. 
H3: Mutual fund ownership will be positively associated with international 
diversification. 
H4: Brokerage firm ownership will be positively associated with international 
diversification. 
H5: Pension fund ownership will be positively associated with international 
diversification. 
Data & Methodology 
Sample:  Between 1994 and 2004, sample of all publicly traded restaurant 
firms were identified with NAICS 722110 in the COMPUSTAT Annual Data 
Tape, accessed through WRDS.  If any firm-year did not have data on the 
variables of interest for this study, such as institutional ownership or 
internationalization, that firm-year was excluded.  We started with identifying 
  
restaurant firms that had international operations and then collated that 
information with the institutional stock holding data.  We finally ended with 
seven restaurant firms (Table 1) that had both international operations and also 
holding of its stock by institutional investors.   Because we are interested in the 
investing behavior of each type of institutional investor in purchasing stocks of 
internationalized restaurant firms, we did not aggregate institutional ownership.  
Previous hospitality studies (Oak & Dalbor 2008b; Oak & Dalbor 2009) also used 
ownership data from each type of institutional investor for analysis without 
adding up institutional ownership. The final sample consisted of 7,909 firm-year 
observations categorized by institutional type.  Because institutional ownership is 
quarterly data and is not aggregated, final sample is large, given that only seven 
restaurant firms are in the sample.  
Table 1. Sample firms  
Coname Ticker 
Mcdonald’s Corp MCD 
Worldwide Restaurant 
Concept 
SZ 
Elxsi Corp. ELXS 
Wendy’s International Inc. WEN 
Darden Restaurant Inc. DRI 
*Yum Brands Inc. YUM 
Sizzler International Inc. SIZZ 
*Tricon Global Restaurant changed its name to Yum Brands in May 2002.  This 
study used Tricon Global Restaurant for analysis prior to May 2002. 
 
Dependent variable: In this study, international diversification is defined 
as geographic expansion of operations.  If U.S. firms have earnings from overseas 
markets, they are considered as internationally diversified. International 
diversification is measured as foreign earnings divided by total earnings (Hua & 
Upneja 2007; Tihanyi et al. 2003).  This is the most common measure used in 
hospitality and mainstream financial research.   As reported earlier, earnings 
numbers were extracted from COMPUSTAT.  
Independent variable: Institutional ownership data is collected from the 
Thompson Financial Spectrum database (Oak & Dalbor 2008 a; Oak & Dalbor 
2008 b).  According to SEC regulations, “all institutions with over $100 million in 
discretionary funds under management and all positions in individual stocks 
greater than $200,000 or 10,000 shares need to file form 13(f) within 45 days after 
  
the last day of each quarter (Oak & Dalbor 2008a p6).”   This study uses these 
forms from 1994 to 2004 in the CDA/Spectrum 13(f) Institutional Stock Holdings.  
Quarterly institutional ownership has five categories: banks, insurance companies, 
mutual funds, brokerage firms and pension fund.  Institutional ownership is 
related to firm’s characteristics.  In the lodging industry, bank and brokerage 
firms were dominant institutional investors in the 1980s and early 1990s.  Pension 
fund has been top institutional investor after 1998.  In the hotel industry, 
institutional ownership is related to size, book value to assets to market value of 
assets, debt ratio, and price and capital expenditure to assets (Oak & Dalbor 
2008b).  In the restaurant industry, institutional ownership is positively related to 
Tobin’s Q, size and ROA (Tsai & Gu 2007).  Debt and institutional ownership is 
negatively related.  Institutional ownership is calculated as shares owned by 
institutions divided by total shares outstanding.   
Control variables: When firms dominate domestic markets, they may 
expand internationally at the same time and use economies of scale (Hua & 
Upneja 2007).  Previous studies show positive relationship between firm size and 
international diversification (Tihanyi et al. 2003; George et al.  2005). Fatemi 
(1994) and Katobe (1990) report that international diversification needs large 
capital for new plants, human resources and information systems.  Large firms 
have enough resources for operating in foreign markets (Tihanyi et al. 2003).  
Therefore, this study uses firm size as a control variable, which is calculated as 
the logarithm of total assets (Tihanyi 2003).   
Firm with high leverage (risky) are less likely to expand internationally 
due to higher risk inherent in internationalization.  We calculate leverage as total 
liabilities over total assets following Hua and Upneja (2007).  Once the domestic 
restaurant market is saturated, firms grow internationally.  George et al. (2005) 
used industry opportunity variable to determine small multinational firms’ 
internationalization.  They examined whether domestic market conditions rather 
than foreign market opportunities promotes internationalization.  In this study, the 
penetration rate is to measure industry opportunity in the U.S. restaurant market 
as an internationalization motivation.  Hua and Upneja (2007) found that 
penetration of domestic market positively affects a firm’s internationalization 
decision.  This study uses penetration rate as individual firms’ annual domestic 
sales over annual industry domestic sales (Hua & Upneja 2007).    
Previous studies (Riahi-Belkaoui 1996; Geringer et al.  1989) showed 
positive relationship between internationalization and performance.  That 
relationship may depend on firms’ abundant resources to cover the costs of global 
business (Tihanyi et al. 2003). Similar to these previous studies, we use ROA as 
  
the performance measurement.  Using ROA also helps us to compare this result 
with previous studies (Riahi-Belkaoui 1996; Lu & Beamish 2001) 
Analysis: This study used pooled regression model to test hypotheses, 
which has been used in previous studies on institutional holdings (Oak & Dalbor 
2008b; Tihanyi et al. 2003).  This method is a statistical tool that is used when the 
dependent and independent variables are metric (Hair et al. 1998). We run 
regressions by type of institutional investors (bank, insurance, brokerage firm, 
mutual fund and pension fund). The results show correlation matrix and 
regressions by institutional investor’s type.  We checked for basic assumptions for 
regression, normality, linearity and homoscedacity.  The three assumptions were 
checked by residual scatter plots, in which one axis is predicted scores of 
international diversification and the other axis is errors of prediction (Tsai & Gu 
2007; Tabachnick & Fidell 2001).  Residual scatterplots do not show any serious 
violation of normality, linearity and homoscedacity of the pooled regression in 
this study.  We identified a very limited number of outliers by using leverage 
points.  Leverage point is an observation that significantly influences on the 
regression results due to its differences from other observations on one or more of 
independent variables (Hair et al. 1998).  We ran the pooled regression model 
with and without outliers.  Because the outliers did not affect the statistical results, 
we kept outliers in the sample.  
Results and Discussion 
After restaurant firms (NAICS 722110) were extracted from the 
COMPUSTAT, only those that had foreign earnings and had institutional 
holdings were kept in the sample.  There are seven firms that reported both 
foreign earnings and institutional holdings and these firms are identified in Table 
1.  Yum brand was formally Tricon Global International which changed its name 
in May 2002. Tricon Global International is included for the analysis prior to May 
2002. Table 2 shows descriptive statistics.  International diversification in sample 
firms was 39 percent, which is very similar to the 41 percent in other industries 
(Tihanyi et al. 2003).  While the percentage of institutional ownership in 
restaurant firms ranged from forty-five to fifty percent in previous research (Tsai 
& Gu 20071), the same ratio in our sample averaged twenty-four percent and 
median was fifteen percent.  By comparing our sample with Tasi and Gu’s study 
(2007), leverage, ROA and size in sample firms are larger than those in restaurant 
firms in Tsai and Gu (2007).   Thus, restaurant firms with international 
diversification tend to have higher leverage, ROA and size. 
                                                          
1While Tsai and Gu (2007) analyzed institutional holdings of 49 restaurant firms, this study uses 7 
restaurant firms with international operations. 
  
Table 2. Descriptive statistics for the sample 
Variable N Mean Standard 
Deviation 
Median 
International 
Diversification 
7909 0.385 0.212 0.473 
Institutional holding  7909 0.241 0.227 0.147 
Size 7909 9.119 1.022 9.811 
Leverage 7909 0.727 0.248 0.571 
Penetration 7849 0.149 0.060 0.195 
ROA 7909 0.133 0.053 0.133 
• International diversification is measured by firms sales from foreign 
operations divided by total firm sales. 
• Institutional holdings for a specific stock in a given quarter are calculated 
by shares owned by institutions divided by total shares outstanding. 
• Size is the logarithm of total assets. 
• Leverage is calculated by total liabilities over total assets. 
• Penetration rate is calculated by individual firms’ annual domestic sales 
over annual industry domestic sales. 
• ROA is net income divided by total assets at the end of the year. 
Table 3 is the correlation matrix of the variables of interest.  International 
diversification has a significantly negative relationship with institutional 
ownership, leverage and ROA.  Size and penetration are significantly positively 
related to the international diversification. 
In order to check for multicollinearity, we used variance inflation factors 
(VIF) for all the regressions.  No VIF score is close to the threshold of 10.  Thus, 
multicollinearity is a problem in this study.  
Model 1 in table 4 includes all types of institutions.  International 
diversification is positively related to institutional ownership, penetration and 
ROA and negatively related to size and leverage.  Because pension fund accounts 
for 63 percent of total observation, model 1 (which includes all firms) is similar to 
model 6 that includes only pension funds. 
The regression model involving banks (model 2 in table 4) indicates 
international diversification is negatively related to institutional ownership, size 
and leverage.  The results support hypothesis 1, which states that bank ownership, 
is negatively associated with international diversification.  Banks with short 
investment horizons prefer short-term earnings.  Thus, they are less likely to 
  
invest in firms with active international diversification agendas.  International 
diversification is positively related to penetration and ROA. 
Table 3. Correlations 
Variable 1 2 3 4 5 6 
International 
diversification 
1.00 -0.377*** 0.772*** -0.642*** 0.965*** -0.068*** 
Institutional 
ownership 
-0.377*** 1.000 -0.335*** 0.504*** -0.434*** 0.425*** 
Size 0.772*** -0.335*** 1.000 -0.687*** 0.966*** -0.057*** 
Leverage -0.641*** 0.504*** -0.687*** 1.000 -0.650*** 0.392*** 
Penetration 0.965*** -0.434*** 0.966*** -0.650*** 1.000 -0.080*** 
ROA -0.068*** 0.425*** -0.057*** 0.391*** -0.080*** 1.000 
 
***: significant at the level of 0.1% 
• International diversification is measured by firms sales from foreign 
operations divided by total firm sales. 
• Institutional holdings for a specific stock in a given quarter are calculated 
by shares owned by institutions divided by total shares outstanding. 
• Size is the logarithm of total assets. 
• Leverage is calculated by total liabilities over total assets. 
• Penetration rate is calculated by individual firms’ annual domestic sales 
over annual industry domestic sales. 
• ROA is net income divided by total assets at the end of the year. 
 
 
 
  
  
Table 4. International diversification by institution type 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
 All institutions Banks Insurance Mutual Fund 
 coefficient p-
value 
coefficient p-
value 
Coefficient p-
value 
Coefficient p-
value 
Constant 0.17*** 0.00 0.91*** 0.00 0.20 0.16 -0.59*** 0.00 
Institutional 
ownership 
0.05*** 0.00 -0.13*** 0.00 0.14 0.56 0.57*** 0.00 
Size -0.02*** 0.00 -0.09*** 0.00 -0.01 0.50 0.07*** 0.00 
Leverage -0.14*** 0.00 -0.34*** 0.00 -0.20 -8.70 -0.06* 0.02 
Penetration 3.21*** 0.00 3.43*** 0.00 2.77*** 0.00 2.09*** 0.00 
ROA 0.16*** 0.00 0.47*** 0.00 0.24*** 0.00 0.24** 0.01 
         
No. of 
observation 
7849  1109  198  116  
R2 (%) 94.2%  97.4%  97.3%  98.2%  
Adjusted 
R2(%) 
94.2%  97.4%  97.3%  98.1%  
 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 
 Brokerage firm Pension fund Banks & Insurance Mutual fund, 
brokerage firm & 
pension fund 
 Coefficient p-
value 
coefficient p-
value 
Coefficient p-
value 
Coefficient p-
value 
Constant 0.08 0.20 0.65*** 0.00 0.76*** 0.00 0.27*** 0.00 
Institutional 
ownership 
-0.25*** 0.00 0.21*** 0.00 -0.07** 0.01 0.09*** 0.00 
Size -0.02 0.08 -0.09*** 0.00 -0.08*** 0.00 -0.03*** 0.00 
Leverage -0.01 0.31 -0.24*** 0.00 -0.31*** 0.00 -0.15*** 0.00 
Penetration 3.65*** 0.00 4.40*** 0.00 3.32*** 0.00 3.52*** 0.00 
ROA -0.42*** 0.00 0.09*** 0.00 0.42*** 0.00 0.11*** 0.00 
         
No. of 
observation 
1550  4936  1307  6602  
R2 (%) 97.5%  93.9%  97.3%  94.1%  
Adjusted 
R2(%) 
97.5%  93.9%  97.3%  94.1%  
 
*, **, ***: significant at the level of 5%, 1% and 0.1% 
  
• International diversification is measured by firms sales from foreign 
operations divided by total firm sales. 
• Institutional holdings for a specific stock in a given quarter are calculated 
by shares owned by institutions divided by total shares outstanding. 
• Size is the logarithm of total assets. 
• Leverage is calculated by total liabilities over total assets. 
• Penetration rate is calculated by individual firms’ annual domestic sales 
over annual industry domestic sales. 
• ROA is net income divided by total assets at the end of the year. 
In the regression model using insurance (model 3 in table 4), international 
diversification is positively related to penetration and ROA, whereas institutional 
ownership, size and leverage are insignificant.  The result do not support 
hypothesis 2.  It is possible that insurance ownership constitutes only a small part 
of the total institutional holding and their influence might be limited.  In any case, 
insurance companies tend to focus on fixed income securities.  Therefore, a better 
test of this hypothesis will be to test it in firms issuing a high percentage of fixed 
income securities and also possessing high levels of institutional holdings with 
insurance firms as the primary institutional investors.  However, that is outside the 
scope of this paper. 
In the regression model that uses mutual funds (model 4 in table 4), 
international diversification is positively related to institutional ownership, size, 
penetration and ROA.  The result supports hypothesis 3, which states that mutual 
fund ownership is positively associated with international diversification.   Mutual 
funds tend to invest in firms with international diversification for short-term and 
positive returns.  This result also supports previous studies (Zahara, Neubaum & 
Huse 2000; Tihanyi et al. 2003).  When firms with mutual fund investments have 
a large size, penetration and ROA, they have more international diversification.  
International diversification is negatively related to leverage because firms with 
high leverage are considered to be risky.  Therefore managers avoid taking 
additional risk through international diversification.  Even though the leverage 
variable has the correct sign on the coefficient, it is not significant. 
The regression model involving brokerage firms (model 5 in table 4) 
indicates international diversification is negatively related to institutional 
ownership and ROA.  The result does not support hypothesis 4, which asserted a 
positive relationship.  International diversification is positively related to 
penetration.  Size and leverage are insignificant.  It is possible that brokerage 
firms help hospitality firms make an equity offering or issue bonds.  Thus they are 
more likely to be interested in domestic investment rather than international 
investment. 
  
In the regression model using pension funds (model 6 in table 4) 
institutional ownership is positively related to international diversification, thus 
hypothesis 5 is supported.  As pension funds have a long-term horizon in the 
lodging industry, large holdings of pension funds will predict better long-term 
performance in restaurant internationalization (Chen et al.  2007).  International 
diversification is positively related to penetration and ROA and negatively related 
to leverage and size.  When domestic market for the restaurant is penetrated, 
sample firms with pension fund investment diversify internationally.  Sample 
firms with high leverage have lower international diversification.     
Model 7 reports the results of combining the two groups that are 
considered pressure sensitive, banks and insurance firms.  International 
diversification was significantly negatively related to the holdings of these two 
types of firms, which was as predicted.  Model 8 reports the results of combining 
the three groups that are considered pressure resistant, pension funds, mutual 
funds, and brokerage firms.  International diversification was significantly 
positively related to the holdings of these three types of pressure resistant 
institutional holdings, again which was as predicted. 
Limitations and Conclusion 
Among five hypotheses about the relationship between institutional 
ownership and international diversification, three hypotheses were supported.  
Investments by pension funds and mutual funds lend support to international 
diversification of restaurant firms.  Whereas, bank investments in restaurant firms 
leads to lower international diversification.  Hypotheses related to brokerage and 
insurance firms are not supported.  As we indicated earlier, the non-significance 
of these two groups might have been from low holdings.  Ownership holding by 
brokerage firms had a significantly negative impact on international expansion.  
Insurance ownership was not significant to international diversification.  A big 
limitation of the study is that there are only seven firms in the sample.  However, 
there are only seven firms that are owned in a measurable way by the institutional 
stockholders.   
This study investigated internationalization decisions by institutional 
ownership.  We provide evidence that suggests that restaurant firms are sensitive 
to needs of institutional firms that invest in their stocks.  In other words, 
operational strategy is influenced by who owns the stock.  Clearly this is a very 
interesting result because it provides a context in which restaurant firms are likely 
to diversify abroad.  However, it also gives rise to some interesting questions.  If a 
firm has saturated the domestic market and wants to diversify abroad, but the 
majority of stock holdings is by pressure sensitive institutional investors.  Will 
  
this firm now be constrained by the ownership or continue towards the path of 
international diversification?  If it does diversify abroad then would there be a 
change in the nature of stockholding in the firm?  This study has only provided 
evidence on the relationship between institutional holding and international 
diversification; future result may throw more light on the directionality of the 
relationship, whether the decision of international diversification drives the kind 
of institutional investors in the firm or the other way around.  Finally, we also 
believe that there might be other corporate decisions that are influenced by the 
structure of institutional ownership.  Future research may shed more light on this 
issue. 
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